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Living Standards, Wellbeing, and 
Public Policy 
1  In t roduc t ion  
It has been five years since the publication of the Treasury paper that first set out its Living 
Standards Framework (LSF) (Treasury 2011). Since then, the LSF has become an 
increasingly central part of Treasury’s strategic direction. Treasury is now explicit about its 
aspiration to be “working towards higher living standards for New Zealanders” (Treasury 
2015a), and the LSF itself has been used across a wide range of Treasury’s policy advising 
work (Treasury 2015c).  
But after five years of implementation and development, there remain questions about what 
exactly the LSF is and how it ought to, or could be, used by Treasury. The aim of this paper 
is to provide answers to these sorts of questions. It is intended as an update of Treasury’s 
2011 paper, drawing on the rapid developments in the academic and policy literature on 
wellbeing in the last five years. We argue that the LSF can be understood as a wellbeing 
framework that articulates, justifies and helps enable the provision of comprehensive 
economic policy advice that improves wellbeing. The remainder of this introduction clarifies 
the main claims we will be advancing in this paper. 
1 .1  The L iv ing Standards Framework broadens the scope 
of  Treasury ’s  economic po l icy  adv ice 
One of the core functions of the Treasury is the provision of economic policy advice to the 
government of the day, concentrating on areas that have a significant impact on economic 
performance (Treasury 2015a). Another core function is to evaluate the policies of other 
government departments. This work draws on a range of expertise in economics, finance, 
and policy evaluation to ensure that when assessing policy proposals the Treasury can 
assess the immediate and long-term social costs and benefits of the proposals and compare 
them to the social costs and benefits of other options, including not implementing a new 
policy (Treasury 2015b).  
This suggests a broad conception of what is meant by ‘economic performance’ – one that 
is not confined to economic growth and income, but considers a wider array of the things 
that support New Zealand’s prosperity in a manner that is both sustainable and inclusive. 
Similarly, ‘economic policy advice’ is broader than just providing assessments of the 
financial or monetary impact of policies, but involves thinking about economic and social 
impacts in a wider sense. The LSF is a major part of Treasury’s effort to make this broad, 
sustainable, and equitable perspective systematic across its policy advice.  
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The LSF does not replace evidence-based and rigorous policy advice, and it doesn’t change 
the responsibility to provide Ministers with free and frank advice that is both practical and 
immediate (Treasury 2015c). Rather, the LSF is intended to augment the way that 
Treasury’s policy advice is developed, by encouraging a more structured and 
comprehensive approach. 
Considering Treasury’s history, this broadening is not unusual. In its early years, Treasury 
primarily handled the government’s day-to-day financial transactions. In the 1920s it took 
on the supervision of other department’s finances, and oversight of the government’s debt. 
And, in the 1960s the department broadened its focus to economic policy advice.1  Each of 
these role-expanding steps also expanded the range of considerations that Treasury had 
to take into account when formulating policy advice. The recent shift to the LSF fits well with 
this tradition. 
1 .2  L iv ing s tandards should be conceptual ised as 
wel lbe ing 
The LSF is a normative framework, which means that it contributes to Treasury’s view on 
which policies should and shouldn’t be advanced. There is nothing unusual about this; the 
provision of policy advice always involves a normative perspective, whether or not that 
perspective is formally articulated. The core normative goal of Treasury and the LSF is 
‘higher living standards’, and this paper argues that living standards should be understood 
as wellbeing.   
As a concept, ‘wellbeing’ is meant to denote ‘quality of life’ and all the ways that life can be 
thought to go well for individuals and for society. We have chosen to use this term 
purposefully, although it is similar to other terms which can be interpreted to mean much 
the same thing. For example, ’wellbeing’ has a similar meaning to the term ‘social welfare’ 
as it is defined in the sub-discipline of welfare economics. But it is very easy to confuse this 
meaning with the way ‘social welfare’ is used to describe policies involving government 
transfers to citizens (perhaps the more ordinary meaning of the phrase). Similarly, 
‘wellbeing’ can be thought of as ‘utility’ in the way that it is understood in economics, but the 
downside of that term is that it tends to bring a very specific set of connotations about 
rational choice theory and utilitarian moral philosophy which don’t cover the totality of the 
tools that public policy can draw on. 
Another reason we choose to focus on the term ‘wellbeing’ is to provide a clear anchor for 
Treasury’s focus on living standards in the vast array of research on wellbeing and how it 
relates to public policy. The idea that fiscal and other traditional economic indicators are not 
enough to evaluate public policies is not new – it is a product of a decades-old international 
recognition that more than just traditional economic indicators matter for wellbeing, and 
thereby for public policy.2 These efforts have led to a proliferation of new ways to assess 
                                                                
1  McKinnon (2003) explains this shift, from clerks to accountants to economists, in his history of the NZ Treasury. 
2  This recognition of the limits of traditional economic indicators led to broadening and refining the existing range of 
economic measures to better capture individual’s wellbeing and progress in the quality of life available in nations 
(Michalos, 2011; Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2009). For many years now, and particularly since the turn of the millennium, 
academics from several disciplines and various countries, and some civil servants, have been increasingly pushing for 
these new measures of wellbeing to play more prominent roles in policy creation and assessment (eg, Bok, 2010; 
Treasury, 2011; Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2012; 2013; 2015; 2016; Kahneman, et al., 2004; Layard, 2005; Michaelson, 
Abdallah, Steuer, Thompson, & Marks, 2009; O’Donnell, et al., 2014; OECD, 2011; Stoll, Michaelson, & Seaford, 2012). 
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wellbeing for policy making,3 some of which we discuss below. This international trend is 
also reflected in (and sometimes a reflection of) a range of work being done by researchers 
in New Zealand.4 
This conception of wellbeing emphasises that in addition to traditional economic measures, 
such as production, income, wealth, and employment, there exists a range of other 
important things that matter for individuals and societies. The purpose of the LSF is to help 
articulate what these are and how they can be actively considered in the development and 
assessment of public policy. 
1 .3  The L iv ing Standards Framework prov ides a st ruc ture 
to  th ink  about  how pol icy  can enhance wel lbe ing 
If ‘living standards’ are understood as ‘wellbeing’, then the ‘Living Standards Framework’ is 
naturally also understood as a ‘wellbeing framework’. Moving beyond broadening the 
objectives of public policy, the LSF is intended to act as a structure which provides some 
analytical scaffolding to help bring more breadth and consistency to the difficult task of 
considering the social costs and benefits of policy proposals. 
The specific model that underpins the LSF is that there are stocks of capitals, which produce 
flows of goods across different dimensions. The capitals affect the range and rate of 
possible flows, and many of the flows can be used to further increase the capitals. The flows 
represented in Figure 1 are a (non-exhaustive) sample of the array of instrumental goods 
that policies might affect. Instrumental goods are things that can be used to make individuals 
and societies flourish; resources that can provide people individually and collectively with 
the ability to pursue lives they value. 
Figure 1: Treasury’s Living Standards Framework 
 
Treasury has also developed an interpretation of the LSF designed to provide more specific 
guidance to policy analysts. The Living Standards Policy Analysis Tool (LST) demonstrates 
how policy analysts could focus on dimensions that are amenable to policy influence and 
are important for the LSF capitals and the ongoing wellbeing of all New Zealanders 
                                                                
3  Some of these have been devised by national governments (eg, Measures of National Wellbeing in the United Kingdom; 
Self, Thomas, & Randall, 2012). Others have been in intranational organisations (eg, the OECD’s Better Life Initiative; 
OECD, 2011) and even not-for-profits (eg, the New Economics Foundations’ wellbeing related policy advice; Stoll, 
Michaelson, & Seaford, 2012). 
4  See, for example, Dalziel and Saunders (2014), Grimes and colleagues (2016), and Jia and Smith (2016). 
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(Treasury, 2015c). The LST (see Figure 2) shows the LSF capitals and five dimensions of 
policy interest. The LST is designed to be augmented with specific measures for each of 
the dimensions (Treasury, 2012; Treasury, 2015c), which should be relevant to the policy 
being analysed. For example, equity measures for general economic policies could include 
the percentage of the population below 50% of the median income, and equity measures 
for educational policies could include the difference in the PISA score5 between the top and 
bottom 10% of students.  
Figure 2: A Living Standards Policy Analysis Tool 
 
1 .4  The L iv ing Standards Framework he lps to  ar t icula te ,  
jus t i fy ,  and enable the broadening of  economic po l icy  
adv ice 
The rest of the paper expands on the claims we have set out in this introduction. We argue 
that interpreting the LSF as a wellbeing framework can help to articulate, justify, and enable 
the kind of shift to a broader range of considerations that Treasury is intending to make in 
its approach to providing economic policy advice. 
Section 2 is about how wellbeing frameworks can help to articulate the objectives of public 
policy. A concern about the LSF is whether its use for policy making is supported by 
academic research, and what other policy-based precedents there are for using these kinds 
of frameworks. In response to this, we outline the main kinds of wellbeing frameworks for 
public policy, indicating the academic support, strengths and weakness, and policy-based 
precedents for each. We then explain that the LSF is best understood as a wellbeing 
framework suitable for underpinning a dashboard approach to assessing national progress 
(as in the forthcoming Living Standards Dashboard) and a social cost-benefit analysis 
approach to evaluating specific kinds of public policies (augmented by the LST).  
                                                                
5  PISA scores are based on the Programme for International Student Assessment, which is a worldwide study by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in member and non-member nations of 15-year-old school 
pupils' scholastic performance on mathematics, science, and reading. See: https://www.oecd.org/pisa/. 
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Section 3 is about how wellbeing frameworks help to justify the broadening of advice about 
economic performance and economic policy. One concern related to this is sometimes 
expressed as a dilemma; on the one hand, there are worries that the LSF is too vague, and 
that the refrain of ‘higher living standards’ is more a platitude than a substantive goal. On 
the other hand, there are worries that if the LSF is taken more seriously, then it may commit 
the Treasury to too much, leading the institution down an uncomfortable path toward 
determining social values. In Section 3, we explain why this is a false dilemma; a middle 
ground exists in which the LSF can be useful for guiding policy without directing it too 
forcefully. Even in its least detailed form, the LSF encourages the creation of more balanced 
policies by broadening the scope of cost and benefits usually considered and any useful 
policy evaluation tool requires some value judgements. 
Section 4 is about how the LSF can help enable the shift to broader and more structured 
policy analysis by encouraging the creation and use of new policy tools that can be 
practically useful for policy makers.  We explore two specific examples of these tools, show 
how they are consistent with the LSF, and gesture at how continued development of these 
sorts of policy tools could lead to future practical applications for policy advice in the 
New Zealand context. 
2  Suppor t  f o r  us ing we l lbe ing f rameworks  to  
ar t i cu la te  the  goa ls  o f  pub l i c  po l i cy  
In this section, we argue that there is considerable academic support and policy-based 
precedent for using conceptually broad wellbeing frameworks, like the LSF, as a way to 
more clearly articulate the goals of public policy. 
2 .1  Wel lbe ing f rameworks for  publ ic  po l icy :  One goal  or  
many goals? 
It might be suggested that wellbeing frameworks narrow the range of policy goals to one: 
wellbeing. A simple wellbeing framework could indeed have this one goal, but more would 
need to be said about what wellbeing consists in before such a framework could guide policy 
advice. Without this extra detail, policy makers would be tasked with making people’s lives 
better, without any account of what actually would make people’s lives better. The wellbeing 
frameworks discussed in Section 2.2 all articulate, or at least imply, a multi-dimensional 
understanding of wellbeing. But, perhaps there is just one thing that makes our lives go well 
for us. And, if so, shouldn’t public policies all aim at that one thing? We’ll argue that, even if 
it’s true that there is only one ultimate good in life, a multi-dimensional wellbeing framework 
is the most appropriate for policy use. 
Even within fairly homogenous cultures, intelligent people do not agree on the main 
importance of one good, let alone the sole importance of one good.6 The example of 
happiness can help explain this. Happiness, understood as feeling good, is a possible 
candidate for being the one and only thing that makes our lives ultimately go well for us. On 
this view, money, freedom, relationships, and everything else that seems good for us is only 
good for us to the extent that they make us feel good. Many people, living in the West, and 
even more so in other places, do not value this kind of happiness much at all, viewing it as 
being of little worth, and sometimes even undesirable.7 Many such people understand 
happiness to mean something completely different, such as correctly traversing a religious 
                                                                
6  See, for example, Carlquist and colleagues (2016). 
7  See Miyamoto and Ma (2011), Joshanloo and colleagues (2014), and Joshanloo and Weijers (2014). 
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path.8 A wellbeing framework for public policy should stipulate goals that are widely 
accepted by the population that they will apply to. So, positing the ‘feeling good’ 
understanding of happiness as the sole ultimate goal of public policy would be problematic 
if introduced in the West, and much worse if introduced in many non-western nations. 
But what if the vast majority of people in a nation did believe that feeling good was the one 
and only thing that makes their lives go well? Even in this case, a multi-dimensional 
wellbeing framework would be more useful for public policy than a uni-dimensional one. 
Public policies are not magic bullets that directly affect how people feel immediately after 
they are implemented. Policies require or encourage various actions to be taken in the 
physical world; health services may be extended, parks may be built, and so on. Using 
terminology from the LSF, public policies should aim at generating flows of instrumental 
goods while responsibly managing the stocks that enable those flows.  
Given that the end goal – happiness – cannot be directly achieved, providing instrumental 
goods is the best that policy makers can do. It is also true that people are made happy by 
different things. As John Locke put it: “Cheese or lobsters . . . though very agreeable and 
delicious fare to some, are to others extremely nauseous and offensive”.9 Even if cheese is 
generally preferred to lobsters, it would be a recipe for disaster if policy makers held only 
cheese as the goal of public policy. Many people appreciate having both on the menu, and 
a minority are allergic to cheese. Much better to have as the goals of public policy would be 
all of the instrumental goods that are amenable to use by people with a diverse range of 
tastes. Locke understood these instrumental goods as liberties – various freedoms that 
enable the pursuit of happiness. 
Multi-dimensional wellbeing frameworks avoid the need for complete agreement on one 
good, and are better suited to guiding public policy even if the relevant people do happen 
to believe there is only one ultimate good (like happiness). Multi- and interdisciplinary 
research on wellbeing indicates several important dimensions, each of which contributes to 
most uni-dimensional conceptions of wellbeing (Taylor, 2015; Wren-Lewis, 2013). In diverse 
societies, not everyone will agree on every dimension of wellbeing, but most people will 
agree on most of them, and nearly everyone will think that at least one of the dimensions is 
relevant to their idiosyncratic view of the good life.10  
Even with a most narrow conception of what ultimately makes our lives go well for us, multi-
dimensional wellbeing frameworks are more appropriate for guiding public policy than uni-
dimensional ones. Given a more inclusive understanding of the range of things that could 
ultimately make our lives go well for us, especially given the increasingly multicultural 
society of New Zealand, relatively broad multi-dimensional wellbeing frameworks are the 
most appropriate for guiding public policy. 
The LSF is consistent with this multi-dimensional approach to wellbeing. The four broad 
capitals of the LSF can be understood as groups of stocks that tend to generate flows of 
different instrumental goods. The range of capitals helps to envisage a large range of flows, 
most of which will contribute to a wide range of good lives. For example, the flows of income 
and leisure time enable individuals to pursue a wide variety of endeavours in line with their 
                                                                
8  While not the dominant view in contemporary New Zealand, religious views of wellbeing are still dominant in many non-
western cultures (Joshanloo, 2014) and were dominant throughout most of history in the west (Michalos & Weijers, 2017). 
9  (Locke, 1975: Book 2, Chapter 21, Section 55) 
10  For example, many academics agree on the importance of freedom (political and civil liberties), economic freedom 
(employment, income, and wealth), health (mental and physical, and life expectancy), education (skills and knowledge), 
relationships (interpersonal and community, including social trust), governance (government effectiveness, safety, and 
lack of corruption), and subjective wellbeing (satisfaction with life, net positive emotions, feelings of autonomy and 
meaning in life). See Helliwell, Layard, and Sachs (2016), Michaelson and colleagues (2009), OECD (2011), Self, 
Thomas, and Randall (2012), and Stoll, Michaelson, and Seaford (2012). 
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particular tastes and view of the good life. Some will pursue a part-time extramural degree 
while others will go fishing, presumably in line with what they think will be best for 
themselves. 
The five dimensions of the LST (economic growth, sustainability for the future, increasing 
equity, social cohesion, and managing risks) can be understood as issues with high policy 
salience relevant to promoting wellbeing in an equitable and secure way for present and 
future New Zealanders. These five dimensions may not capture everything, but they serve 
as a useful framework for policy analysts considering some of the main ways in which 
policies might affect the wellbeing-related capitals of the LSF. 
2 .2  The range and st rengths of  mul t i -d imens ional  
wel lbe ing f rameworks for  publ ic  po l icy 
This part of the paper discusses the range of wellbeing frameworks that might be used by 
policymakers, and indicates some of the strengths and weakness of using them for 
measuring national progress and assessing specific policies. As mentioned, an increasingly 
dominant view of academics and policymakers is that economic growth and other traditional 
economic considerations are generally insufficient for assessing the wellbeing impact of 
public policies, and should not be the sole measures given increasingly viable alternatives. 
As such, the question is not whether there is a case to consider more than the traditional 
economic indicators, but how best to do so and what those additional indicators should be. 
Even when a multidimensional conceptualisation of wellbeing is settled on, there exist 
several different general approaches regarding how to arrange the dimensions into a 
framework useful for guiding public policy. The most-discussed candidates for that task are: 
income equivalence methods, composite indices, dashboards, and subjective 
approaches.11 Each method is explained and evaluated below. 
2 . 2 . 1  I n co me  e qu iv a l en ce  
Income equivalence methods assume that income is a useful metric for evaluating different 
outcomes, and require the evaluation of all goods through a monetary lens. Overall 
aggregate measurements, like GDP, are often used, although the monetary metric is 
adjusted in some ways to account for non-market values. While it might be thought that 
income equivalence models assume that only income is ultimately good for us, the models 
can be viewed as being based on multi-dimensional wellbeing frameworks—with the value 
of many ultimate goods being approximated in the common currency of money.  
As a measure of national progress, income equivalence suffers from nearly all of the 
problems that affect unadjusted measures of national production. Many aspects of people’s 
lives, and goods and activities that contribute to those aspects, are difficult to monetise in a 
way that captures their general value, let alone the different values they might have for 
different individuals. Few doubt, for example, that freedom is vital for wellbeing, but the 
equivalent monetary values of various liberties are difficult to estimate. There are obvious 
economic costs to not permitting the education of girls and women. Income equivalence 
models can approximate the economic costs well, but the various mechanisms for 
approximating the dollar value of more abstract goods, such as feeling free, and not being 
the subject of oppression, require many assumptions, including some for which are fairly 
speculative. 
                                                                
11  Fleurbaey & Blanchet (2013) provide a useful historical overview of the development of these approaches.   
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As a day-to-day policy analysis tool, income equivalence models fare quite well. By 
translating as many of the relevant variables as possible into the common currency used in 
governmental budgets, policy assessments often result in clear evaluations that are also 
highly amenable to overall departmental and governmental planning. The useful simplicity 
of income equivalence models is the counterpart of ignoring the factors that are difficult to 
monetise. Not many day-to-day policy decisions could result in a substantial loss of 
freedom, but many decisions will include important potential effects on wellbeing that will 
be ignored by using a pure income equivalence method.  
A common way to use income equivalence as a day-to-day policy assessment tool is via a 
traditional cost-benefit analysis. Traditional economic factors fit easily into such a cost-
benefit analysis, and some other factors are included using ‘willingness to pay’ and other 
methods. Willingness to pay methods often use either the dollar value people seem to put 
on the variable in question or the dollar value people claim they would put on the variable, 
such as if they were asked how much they would pay to keep a national park open to 
visitors. Willingness to pay techniques have several problems (Adams, 1993; Fujiwara & 
Campbell, 2011), including the problem that many important factors cannot reasonably be 
evaluated in this way. In addition to the freedom example mentioned, consider also anything 
that people haven’t had direct experience with; people can guess, but predicting how much 
we will like something we know little about is not something that humans are good at.12  
Even when people’s actual behaviour is used to determine willingness to pay, the results 
may not provide a reasonable estimate of the value of the good in question. Social 
psychologists and behavioural economists have documented dozens of ways in which 
weakness of will and irrationality plague human behaviour in a wide range of circumstances, 
from saving for retirement, to charitable giving, to evaluating public policies.13 The simple 
truth is that one of the key assumptions underpinning the revealed preference method—
that people behave rationally—is highly questionable.14 Importantly, various psychological 
heuristics and environmental factors influence behaviour in a particular (as opposed to 
random) way, such that these structural biases make people predictably irrational (Ariely, 
2008). For example, when surveyed, most people report understanding the importance to 
their own wellbeing of starting to save for retirement early. And yet, a large proportion of 
new employees fail to tick a box on a form to tell their employers to redirect a small portion 
of their wages to a retirement savings fund, even when employers will match that 
contribution. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) report that by simply changing the framing of the 
choice, by automatically signing new employees up for a retirement plan and allowing them 
to tick a box to withdraw from the plan, only a tiny fraction of new employees would choose 
to make no contribution to their retirement savings. 
In summary, income equivalence wellbeing frameworks can incorporate multiple outcomes 
as end goals for public policy, but have the shortcoming of favouring outcomes which can 
be easily translated into a monetary value. 
                                                                
12  See: Ayton, Pott, and Elwakili (2007), Gilbert (2006), and Wilson and Gilbert (2003). 
13  See: Ariely (2008), Baumeister and Tierney (2011), Kahneman (2011), and Thaler and Sunstein (2008). 
14  This is true whether rationality is defined as making decisions that should be expected to satisfy one’s deepest desires 
or as making decisions that should be expected to improve one’s wellbeing. 
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2 . 2 . 2  Compos i t e  ind i ces  
Composite indices aggregate different measurement dimensions into a single index, to 
serve as the main or only indicator. For example, Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness 
(GNH) Index is a composite score derived from nine equally weighted domains, each of 
which contributes to the four ‘pillars of happiness’: political, economic, cultural, and 
environmental.  
Much like income equivalence models, composite indices have the advantage of including 
many potentially important factors into one easy-to-use value. The main downside of 
composite indices is that their surface simplicity draws attention away from several 
important and potentially value-laden decisions. The choices about which domains and 
indicators to use, and how to weight them, can be accused of being arbitrary or as resulting 
from an effort to determine social values. A notable practical concern with composite indices 
occurs when the government can adjust weightings of domains and indicators as they see 
fit. One commentator has accused the Bhutanese government of doing just this; changing 
the weight of some indicators to ensure that GNH rose, rather than fell, between reports 
(Givel, 2012; c.f. Morrison & Weijers, 2012, p. 53). 
The most well-known composite index that is based on a wellbeing framework and designed 
for use by policy makers is the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI).15 The 
underlying wellbeing framework for the HDI is that three dimensions contribute equally to 
the capability to live well: A long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent material standard 
of living. A sub-index, based on one or two indicators, is created for each dimension, and 
the mean of these sub-indices is used as the composite index (see Figure 3).16  
Figure 3: The United Nations Human Development Index17
 
The HDI is not intended to be exhaustive of all of the dimensions that enable human 
flourishing, nor is it intended to capture all policy-relevant considerations, such as equality 
and sustainability. The simplicity of the HDI makes it possible to record data for nearly every 
nation. This wealth of data enables nations to compare their progress with others, potentially 
enabling discussions about why a particular nation improved its HDI score while another 
similarly situated nation did not. But this simplicity also has its costs. Freedom of speech, 
religion, and association might be considered vital for achieving our particular view of the 
good life, but they are not even indirectly represented in the HDI. Furthermore, the equal 
weighting afforded to each dimension seems arbitrary in a way that raises the question of 
why the dimensions are aggregated at all. 
                                                                
15  See http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi  
16  See the technical report for a more detailed explanation: 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2015_technical_notes.pdf  
17  http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi  
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Both the GNH Index and the HDI are broader measures of national progress than traditional 
income or production measures, which allows them to capture more of the goods that are 
instrumental to wellbeing. However, they both demonstrate an issue with composite indices; 
policymakers would face the dangerous dichotomy of weighing the dimensions arbitrarily, 
or by fiat—effectively determining social values. An interesting solution to this issue would 
be to have the public rank a broad range of policy goals (such as the range suggested by 
the Better Life Index18), and have the index weight each dimension accordingly.  
For use in assessing specific policies, composite indices like the HDI will usually fail to offer 
any concrete advice because the measures used to populate the various dimensions will 
not be directly relevant to the policy issue in question. Nonetheless, if the composite index 
incorporates many dimensions and related indicators, then the range of potential impacts 
considered could broaden as policy analysts developed a habit of thinking through how 
each dimension might be affected.  
So, as wellbeing frameworks, composite indices have multiple goods as the end goals of 
public policy, but stipulate the proportion of ultimate value that each of the goods provides 
for wellbeing. Furthermore, any goods left out of the framework are essentially stipulated to 
have no ultimate value for wellbeing. 
2 . 2 . 3  Da sh bo ar ds  
Dashboard approaches to operationalising wellbeing are similar to composite indices, 
except that they do not try to aggregate across the dimensions of wellbeing. Instead 
dashboards present a score or set of scores for several dimensions of wellbeing. In the 
United Kingdom (UK), the Office for National Statistics (ONS) produces Measures of 
National Wellbeing and presents them following a dashboard approach. The most recent 
release of the Measures of National Wellbeing includes ten dimensions and reports on 43 
indicators (UK ONS, 2016a).19 Statistics New Zealand also produces a dashboard of 
national progress that has three main dimensions (social, economic, and environmental) 
and three cross-over dimensions (social-economic, economic-environmental, and social-
environment) with sixteen sub-dimensions, and multiple indicators chosen from a bank of 
85.20 Similarly, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
wellbeing framework used in its How's Life report (shown in Figure 4) uses 11 outcome 
dimensions and four capital stocks derived from the 2009 report of the Stiglitz, Sen, and 
Fitoussi Commission. 
                                                                
18  The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Better Life Index website allows users to adjust the 
weighting of several dimensions and compare which OECD nations perform the best on that specific index 
(http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/).  
19 The indicators reported on in the most recent Measures of National Wellbeing have changed since the first report in 
2012. Apparently, the differences are mainly based on which data are available in the relevant reporting years (UK 
ONS, 2016b). The New Zealand Social Report takes a similar approach, looking across 10 outcome domains that are 
largely the same as those used by the ONS (http://socialreport.msd.govt.nz/documents/2016/msd-the-social-report-
2016.pdf). 
20  The progress indicators are described by Statistics New Zealand as “satisfy[ing] a growing demand for measures of 
societal progress that incorporate all areas of life.” http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/snapshots-of-nz/nz-
progress-indicators/Home/About.aspx. The set of domains included, and the justifications given for the implementation 
of the indicators, suggest that this is not explicitly a wellbeing framework. Instead, it would be best described as a tool 
for assessing how New Zealand is progressing in a number of domains of interest to New Zealanders. 
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Figure 4: The OECD Framework for Measuring Wellbeing and Progress
 
The LSF is similar to the OECD’s wellbeing framework. Figure 4, shows that the OECD’s 
framework uses nearly identical capitals to the LSF, and that many of the outcome 
dimensions are flows in the LSF. 
Two key considerations for constructing a dashboard-based wellbeing model are: how 
much information to include on the specific indicators underpinning each domain, and 
whether to aggregate scores for each domain.21 The UK ONS’ Measures of National 
Wellbeing takes a very informative and non-aggregative approach; every indicator is listed 
individually with no attempt to provide scores at the domain level (UK ONS, 2016a). By 
taking this approach, the model becomes highly transparent, avoiding most of the concerns 
mentioned about composite indices above. The main drawback of a highly informative and 
non-aggregative dashboard approach is the final product could be highly complex and not 
easily accessible to non-specialists. Through clever graphic design, the UK ONS have 
managed to minimise this worry while also including an indication of whether each indicator 
has improved, remained the same, or worsened over the last period of measurement (UK 
ONS, 2016a). 
                                                                
21  There are other important considerations. A third important consideration is whether to include one indicator from each 
domain to act as headline indicators. While headline indicators increase the ease with which the results of the model 
can be ascertained, the problems of losing information and deciding which indicators deserve to be headliners need to 
be seriously considered. For a defense of headline indicators by the New Economics Foundation in their Five Headline 
Indicators for National Success, see Jeffrey and Michaelson (2015). A fourth is whether to include subjective indicators, 
which is discussed in the next sub-section. A fifth is the extent to which the domains and measures allow comparison 
with other nations and previous years of the host nation. More detail on these issues can be found in these documents 
about Israel’s effort to create a dashboard wellbeing framework for public policy: One published by the Israeli 
government (http://www.sviva.gov.il/English/Indicators/Documents/Wellbeing-Indicators-for-Israel-April2014.pdf) and the 
other by the OECD (2016).  
 B a c k g r o u n d  P a p e r  f o r  t h e  2 0 1 6  S t a t e m e n t  o n  t h e  L o n g - T e r m  F i s c a l  P o s i t i o n :  
L i v i n g  S t a n d a r d s ,  W e l l b e i n g ,  a n d  P u b l i c  P o l i c y   1 2  
 
Many wellbeing researchers argue that a dashboard approach fits best with theoretical 
conceptions of wellbeing, and is the most useful for policymakers.22 It has been argued that 
some commonly discussed dimensions of wellbeing are statistically independent from each 
other, such that increases in one domain of wellbeing aren’t always mirrored in the other 
domains.23 For example, although health status and income are somewhat correlated, they 
are conceptually and empirically distinguishable. The likely existence of factors that will 
improve health but not income, and vice versa, means that some policies could have the 
effect of improving health but not income, and vice versa.24 Furthermore, the fact that 
different people, even within the same nation, have different ideas about what makes their 
lives go better25 highlights both the importance of multidimensional conceptions of wellbeing 
and the problem of giving weights to those domains in order to create a composite index. 
So, a dashboard approach to conceptualising and measuring wellbeing is preferable to a 
composite index because it is more transparent and does not face as many ‘arbitrary vs. 
determining social values’ dilemmas. This all makes dashboard wellbeing frameworks 
excellent for assessing national progress. However, as tools for assessing specific policies, 
it is not as clear cut how well they fare.  
Dashboard approaches do not make the final step to an overall index, or a common 
currency, so they do not always produce clear evaluations when used to assess policies. 
As mentioned, income equivalence approaches attempt to put a dollar figure on all of the 
potential outcomes of the proposed policy. In this way, it is often clear whether the policy is 
good value for money. In defence of dashboards, it might be suggested that it is a virtue of 
the approach that it does not assign a monetary value to the various outcomes. We already 
suggested that the methods for assigning a dollar value to more abstract goods are 
problematic, not least because they can obscure important questions about what value 
these abstract goods have for various people. Dashboards highlight the range of important 
considerations, and assign values to indicators or sub-dimensions that can be compared to 
the equivalent values scored by other potential policies. At this stage, policy makers may 
be faced with making a choice between various goods, a choice that will effectively entail 
determining social values. To avoid this, there should be some politically established 
ordering or weighting of values. Fortunately, there are several options for achieving this. 
Often, the government of the day dictates the ordering or weighting of the values relevant 
to particular policies. In a representative democracy, the government of the day is probably 
entitled to make these judgments on the basis that it was elected, presumably at least 
partially on the basis that some values would be given more weight than others. But, there 
are other methods available for establishing weights for different instrumental goods. Au, 
Coleman, and Sullivan (2015), presented multiple pairs of trade-offs to New Zealand 
citizens, all related to policy issues about retirement. The data can be used to make fairly 
precise orderings of preferences for each participant, and for larger groups. The method 
usefully avoids some of the issues with abstract stated preference approaches because the 
many individual decisions are about fairly specific trade-offs. Other methods include 
wholesale regular surveying of stated value preferences, and the subjective wellbeing 
                                                                
22  Recent examples include: (Forgeard, Jayawickreme, Kern, & Seligman, 2011; Hicks, Tinkler, & Allin, 2013). 
23  See: (Hone, Jarden, Schofield, & Duncan, 2014; Huppert & So, 2013; OECD, 2013; UK ONS, 2011). 
24  The same could be said for perceived meaning in life and happiness; they are somewhat correlated, but they are 
conceptually and empirically distinguishable, and appear to have many non-overlapping causes (Baumeister, Vohs, 
Aaker, & Garbinsky, 2013). 
25  See, for example, Carlquist and colleagues (2016). 
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approach, which is discussed in Section 4. With any of these augmentations, dashboard 
wellbeing framework approaches to assessing public policies could work fairly well. 
So, as wellbeing frameworks, dashboard approaches have multiple goods as the end goals 
of public policy, but do not include a metric for calculating their relative contributions to 
wellbeing. Furthermore, any goods left out of the framework are essentially stipulated to 
have no ultimate value for wellbeing. 
2 . 2 . 4  Sub j ec t i ve  approaches  
Some wellbeing researchers are enamoured of conceptions of wellbeing that focus on 
subjective indicators instead of, or alongside, more traditional objective measures of 
wellbeing. Richard Layard, one of the most prominent proponents of the use of measures 
of subjective wellbeing for public policy, recommends that “quality of life, as people 
experience it, ought to be a key measure of progress and a central objective for any 
government” (Layard, 2011). Similar views are held by Derek Bok (2010), Ed Diener (2011), 
Bruno Frey (2008), and the World Happiness Report team (Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 
2016). At the heart of the case in favour of subjective measures of wellbeing is the worry 
that objective indicators may never fully capture how people’s lives feel to them on the 
inside; someone might be wealthy, well-educated, and physically healthy, but at the same 
time, she might be entirely miserable. While adding further domains to a dashboard might 
partially mitigate this worry, it seems possible to add a long list of non-objective policy goods 
to the previous list and for the person to still not be happy.  
There is also considerable public support in some nations for what is perhaps the most 
salient subjective state26 – happiness – to be a key goal of public policy. For example, in a 
2005 BBC opinion poll, 1001 participants were asked whether the government's main 
objective should be the "greatest happiness" or the "greatest wealth" with 81% reporting 
that happiness should be the main goal (Easton, 2006, np). This result resembles an 
unscientific poll taken on The Economist’s website during a debate between Richard Layard 
and Paul Ormerod, in which the motion “new measures of economic and social progress 
are needed for the 21st-century economy” (using happiness science to inform policymaking 
was the focus of the debate) received 83% of the support from the online audience (of 
unspecified size). In another poll, economic measures such as GDP were endorsed as a 
measure of national wellbeing by just 30% of respondents (n = 6,870), compared to 79% 
endorsing ‘life satisfaction’ as a measure of national wellbeing (UK ONS, 2011). 
Subjective measures of wellbeing usually ask respondents to report on their life as they 
experience it, such as the frequency of positive feelings last week or an evaluative judgment 
about how their life as a whole is going. Life satisfaction questions, such as “All things 
considered, how satisfied are you with your life?”, are especially popular with economists 
and policy-makers, most likely because of their broad applicability and conceptual affinity 
with the ‘utility’ of welfare economics. Other measures of subjective wellbeing seem to have 
little or no direct connection to happiness—they may ask for evaluative judgements with 
particular domains of life, such as satisfaction with relationships, perceived ease of access 
to amenities, or the extent to which one’s life is being lived in line with one’s values.  
                                                                
26  Happiness is best understood as a subjective state, in the sense that we are the best judges of our own happiness 
(Layard, 2005; 2010; Lyubomirsky, 2008; Veenhoven, 2002). 
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There are several worries about subjective measures of wellbeing being used to guide 
public policy. Some worries about biased responses to subjective wellbeing surveys are 
relatively unfounded from the public policy perspective. Assuming large numbers are 
surveyed, the surveys are carefully crafted, and some surveys are longitudinal, the vast 
majority of bias will cancel itself out or be identified and corrected for. But, there is a more 
pressing worry. Even ardent supporters of measures of subjective wellbeing, such as Daniel 
Kahneman, have expressed concern that they may not be sensitive enough to the levers of 
policy, resulting in reports in which the signals are drowned out by the noise.27 The short 
response here is that academics and policy makers have been hard at work dealing with 
these issues to the extent that many researchers and policy makers will endorse the use of 
subjective measures of wellbeing in at least some contexts.28  
Of course, the usefulness of subjective wellbeing for guiding public policy does not entail 
that a fully subjective wellbeing framework would be a good guide for public policy. While 
how our life feels to us on the inside should have some importance, problems arise for policy 
making if we give it sole importance. Some people have very peculiar preferences. Others 
have very common preferences, but are very hard to please. Someone might be very 
satisfied with his life, but only because the crumbling economic and social infrastructure of 
our nation has not yet impacted on his reclusive lifestyle. Using Alex Michalos’ terminology, 
when external conditions are bad, and people’s mistaken perception of the conditions 
causes them to feel good, and act inappropriately, we can describe the situation as the 
Fool’s Paradise.29 Much better, would be a Real Paradise, in which accurate reflection on 
excellent external conditions creates positive subjective states in people. 
Many philosophers have argued that considering a hypothetical scenario about an 
‘experience machine’ clearly demonstrates that some things in life are more important than 
positive experiences.30 Robert Nozick (1974; 1989) invites readers to imagine a machine that 
provides them with a life full of happiness in such a way that they never realise they are living 
a fake life. Disregard any responsibilities they might have to others in the real world. Should 
readers choose to permanently connect to such a machine, foregoing their real life for a life 
of machine-generated happiness? Nozick (1974; 1989) argues that people’s reluctance to 
connect to such a machine for the rest of their lives reveals that more than our experiences 
(subjective states) matters to us; that there is something about a life lived in close contact with 
reality that is more valuable to us than how our experiences feel on the inside.31  
                                                                
27  See Jarden (2011) on Kahneman’s view. See Johns and Ormerod (2008) for criticism of subjective measures of 
wellbeing based on this worry, and Turton (2009) in response. 
28  The OECD have produced a comprehensive manual on how and why to measure subjective wellbeing for policy and 
national progress purposes (OECD, 2013). The UK ONS have also published the results of their major investigation of 
measures of subjective wellbeing for public policy (UK ONS, 2011). Krueger and Stone (2014) provide a brief survey of 
the current state of the measures that are useful for assessing subjective wellbeing for policy. The science is now at the 
stage where although some concerns remain, using subjective measures of wellbeing for public policy is well-supported 
(eg, Bok, 2010; Diener, 2006; 2011; Diener & Scollon, 2003; Frey, 2008; Frey & Stutzer, 2007; Helliwell, Layard, & 
Sachs, 2016; OECD, 2011; Seligman, 2011; UK ONS, 2011). 
29  See, for example, Michalos and Weijers (2017). 
30  See, for example, Tiberius and Hall (2010), or, for a fuller list of those using the argument in this way, see: (Weijers, 
2014; Weijers & Schouten, 2013). 
31  Recent empirical work on experience machine thought experiments reveals that many people actually would connect to 
a suitable machine, indicating a preference for fake but highly pleasurable experiences over average but real 
experiences (Weijers 2014). Further research is required, but there may be a cultural shift towards valuing experiences, 
regardless of their veracity. If this shift is occurring, virtual reality and augmented reality games may be both a symptom 
a driver of it. 
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Subjective wellbeing frameworks seem somewhat problematic for guiding public policy, at 
least on their own. A much more useful approach would be to incorporate subjective 
measures of wellbeing into a dashboard wellbeing framework. Including subjective and 
objective wellbeing indicators in a dashboard framework is the clearest way to signal that a 
Real Paradise is the goal, and not just a Fool’s Paradise.32 Both the UK ONS’ Measures of 
National Wellbeing and the OECD’s Framework for Measuring Wellbeing and Progress 
combine objective and subjective measures. Hicks, Tinkler, and Allin (2013) also explain 
how to incorporate subjective wellbeing indicators into a dashboard wellbeing framework. 
So, used to compliment dashboard wellbeing frameworks, subjective approaches include 
people’s positive feelings and judgements as being among the end goals of public policy, 
but do not include a metric for calculating their relative contributions to wellbeing. If one of 
the subjective measures is global in nature, such as a life satisfaction indicator, then on the 
assumption that all potential goods will have some effect on life satisfaction, this method 
can take a broader range of wellbeing-related goods into account than the other methods 
mentioned in this section. 
2 .3  The LSF can underp in  a dashboard wel lbe ing 
f ramework for  nat ional  progress and a broad approach 
to  socia l  cost -benef i t  analys is 
The four broad capitals of the LSF—economic (financial and physical), natural, social, and 
human—are best understood as groups of goods that tend to produce flows which 
contribute to various components of wellbeing. The LSF is not a dashboard because it 
doesn’t include measures or indicators that are specific enough to infer the obvious 
measures to use. However, if the flows were fully enumerated, and both the flows and the 
capitals had associated measures, then the LSF would be a dashboard wellbeing 
framework. And, like the OECD’s Framework for Measuring Wellbeing and Progress, it 
would be designed with guiding public policy specifically in mind.  
In addition to not being a dashboard, the LSF is not currently a very useful model of national 
progress. However, further elaboration and operationalisation of the LSF, including the 
addition of more flows that are clear contributors to wellbeing, could make it very useful as 
a model of national progress.  
The LST can be understood as a tool for encouraging policy assessors to consider a wide 
range of policy-related factors relevant to promoting wellbeing in an equitable and secure 
way for present and future people. In particular, the LST focusses on five policy-apt 
dimensions (economic growth, sustainability for the future, increasing equity, social 
cohesion, and managing risks) related to the four capitals of the LSF. The LST is also not 
a dashboard because it doesn’t include stipulated measures. By design, the LST should be 
operationalised in each instance of policy assessment by including the most timely and 
relevant measures available.33 While this might seem like a weakness, consider a fully 
specified dashboard wellbeing framework for day-to-day policy analysis. The UK ONS’ 2016 
Measures of National Wellbeing includes 43 indicators, but not one on water quality. So, if 
policy analysts were limited to those 43 indicators, an analysis of an inland waterways 
restoration project would report few, if any, tangible benefits.  
                                                                
32  Or a Real Hell (which is when people accurately assess and feel miserable about their objectively terrible living conditions). 
33  Treasury has also recommended that new dimensions be introduced as and where necessary (2015c). 
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The only possible weakness of not stipulating measures for day-to-day policy making is that 
stipulating measures at least inspires the collection of data for those indicators. In 
New Zealand, many policy analysis situations will be hampered by a lack of reliable data 
for indicators that are required for the kind of broad assessments that the LST attempts to 
encourage.  
The LST is best understood as encouraging broader and more structured social cost-benefit 
analyses of public policies.34 The nature of much of Treasury’s day-to-day policy advice is 
assessing the relative merits of similar policy proposals against specific goals set out by the 
government and the general goal of sustainable and equitable wellbeing set out by the LSF. 
As such, it is not always necessary to use a common currency, as the income equivalence 
approach does. The values that cannot be monetised in a social cost-benefit analysis can 
instead be presented alongside the overall dollar value associated with each policy 
proposal, and the value-based decision that remains can be made politically. 
So, assuming the required data are available, the LST could effectively encourage broad 
and rigorous policy assessments. The five dimensions are particularly useful for policy 
analysts at Treasury because economic growth, sustainability for the future, increasing 
equity, social cohesion, and managing risks are all topics that are essential in assessing the 
types of issues that make up much of Treasury's day-to-day work. 
3  The  L iv ing  Standards  Framework  can 
use fu l l y  gu ide pub l i c  po l i cy  w i thout  
de termin ing soc ia l  va lues  
Now that we have a clearer conception of what the LSF is, we can address a supposed 
dilemma it faces. On the one hand, there are concerns that the LSF is too vague, and that 
the capitals and dimensions of the LSF and the LST may be mentioned in the footnotes of 
policy proposals and assessments, but they will not substantively affect policy decisions. 
On the other hand, there are concerns that if the LSF is taken more seriously, then it may 
commit the Treasury to too much, leading the institution down an uncomfortable path toward 
determining social values.  
3 .1  The LSF helps make the goal  of  ‘h igher  l i v ing 
s tandards ’  more substant ive and at ta inable 
The first horn of the dilemma is that the LSF isn’t sufficiently concrete and so is unlikely to 
substantively change policy assessments. On the understanding that the day-to-day policy 
analysis version of the LSF – the LST – has no stipulated measures, policy analysts may 
be reluctant to pay more than lip service to the less-traditional LST dimensions of 
sustainability, increasing equity, social cohesion, and managing risks. Lack of experience 
with, and tools for, these domains might mean that a more traditional cost-benefit analysis 
process is followed, except that phrases like ‘possibly some equity concerns’ might appear 
in a footnote alongside the verdict.  
                                                                
34  Social cost benefit analyses often assess the costs and benefits of policy proposals using a range of measures, 
including: traditional economic data, data on natural, human, or social capitals converted into monetary values using 
willingness to pay and related techniques, and perhaps some difficult-to-monetise indicators listed by, but not directly 
involved in, the cost benefit calculation (Treasury 2015b). 
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In many ways this paper is a step towards addressing this critique. Section 2 outlined a 
range of ways in which the LSF could be operationalised in order to make its use easier, on 
the basis of a range of international precedents. And the Treasury has already given some 
examples and general advice on how the LSF and LST could be used (Au & Karacaoglu 
2015; Treasury 2012; 2015c), and we sketch out a couple more examples in Section 4 of 
this paper. 
On the whole it is suffice to say that there is a role to be played by the Treasury in taking 
the lead to demonstrate how to include a broad range of considerations when creating and 
assessing public policy. Given enough continuous pressure and the availability of good tools 
and exemplars, the less-traditional LST dimensions could become far more than occasional 
footnotes in the record of policy analysis in New Zealand. 
3 .2  The LSF does not  determine soc ia l  va lues 
Whether the LSF forces policymakers to ‘determine social values’, can be seen as a 
question of political philosophy. Given that frank policy assessment usually contains 
recommendations, the work of Treasury necessarily involves some normative 
commitments. If public policies are to be usefully compared, then various costs and benefits 
have to be given some value. Deciding how to attribute value to a diverse range of costs 
and benefits, and what costs and benefits to consider in a cost benefit analysis, also 
includes making value judgements about what deserves evaluation and how that evaluation 
should be performed. In this way, whenever Treasury’s analysts create policies, give policy 
advice, or assess policies, they are implying the endorsement of normative commitments, 
even if they are simply following the precedent set by some earlier normative commitment. 
A related concern is that when various government departments do begin using the less-
traditional dimensions of the LST, it will be because certain policy makers are attempting to 
make their favoured policies appear more viable than they should. Treasury already 
publishes a guideline on the reasonable use of social cost-benefit analyses (Treasury, 
2015b), in which methods for dealing with high levels of uncertainty, and various methods 
to evaluate difficult-to-assess outcomes, are addressed. Abuses of the LST in this way are 
likely to violate those guidelines. Furthermore, such violations are likely to be identified 
during external assessment of policy, preventing the overzealous policy maker from 
determining social values.  
On the other hand, a very detailed social cost benefit analysis, with carefully considered 
expected value ranges, might demonstrate that the government really should consider the 
policy proposal, and perhaps precisely because it is, on this broader view, in the best 
interests of all New Zealanders, now and in the future. So, there is no clear reason to think 
that broadening the scope of policy analysis, in the way that the LSF and the LST do, is 
likely to allow the personal values of policy makers more influence over policy than they 
have currently. The basic criteria for assessing policies will remain the same, there will just 
be some cases in which a broader set of dimensions will be assessed. More theoretical 
versions of the ‘determining social values’ critique are discussed below. 
Nevertheless, as much as the LSF and any version of the LST are attempts to guide 
Treasury’s policy analysis, it might be suggested that policymakers will do more in the way 
of determining social values than they otherwise might. However, by assessing the LSF 
through the lens of an old debate in political philosophy, we can see how using the LSF to 
guide public policy seems less likely to determine social values than many other methods.  
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In the traditional debate between ‘resource-based’ and ‘welfare-based’ theories of justice, 
resource-based theories of justice are primarily concerned with the just distribution of the 
primary goods generally thought to be required for a broad range of conceptions of 
wellbeing, such as income and employment (Daniels, 1990). In contrast, welfare-based 
theories of justice are concerned with the just distribution of wellbeing itself, such as life 
satisfaction and net positive feelings. Wellbeing-based policy analysis tools inspired by 
resource-based theories of justice can be thought of as assessing the comparative value of 
public policies on the efficiency with which they produce contributors to wellbeing. We’ll call 
them ‘contributor tools’. Wellbeing-based policy analysis tools inspired by welfare-based 
theories of justice, on the other hand, can be thought of as assessing the comparative value 
of public policies on the efficiency with which they produce components of wellbeing. We’ll 
call them ‘component tools’. 
Comparing wellbeing contributor tools with wellbeing component tools, contributor tools are 
less likely to have the effect of determining social values. Component tools stipulate the 
desired wellbeing outcome or outcomes in order to assess public policies. When the desired 
outcomes of public policy are set in this way, then the Government’s social spending is set 
on a particular conception of wellbeing. Determining social values in this way is only 
unproblematic if everyone agrees on the desired outcomes set in the component tools. As 
discussed above, widespread agreement on the main importance of one or a few 
components of wellbeing seems unlikely, even among intelligent and well-educated 
people.35 For example, devoutly religious people, for whom wellbeing has little to do with 
earthly satisfactions, hold a very different view of what ultimately makes lives go well for the 
people living them compared to the completely earth-bound view of secular humanists. 
Rawls argues that, due to globalisation, and the attendant intermingling of various cultures 
and religions, these differences do not appear to be fading away over time (Rawls, 2005). 
So, stipulating the end goals of public policy, like component tools do, seems likely to 
determine social values in favour of the dominant group in a nation, quite possibly at the 
expense of minorities.36 
As mentioned earlier, the LST is designed to encourage the consideration of a broader 
range of contributors to wellbeing, not components of wellbeing. The flows outlined in the 
LSF and the dimensions of the LST all plausibly contribute to a wide variety of candidate 
components of wellbeing for current and future New Zealanders.37 The best way to 
understand the way in which the flows of the LSF, and the indicators that might be used for 
                                                                
35  Recent empirical studies show that despite some convergence on the importance of relationships and inner harmony, 
lay understandings of happiness, satisfaction, and wellbeing vary cross-culturally (Delle Fave et al., 2016; Joshanloo 
2014; Joshanloo & Weijers 2014) and within cultures (Carlquist et al., 2016). 
36  One potential definition of wellbeing that many people could agree on is life satisfaction—the best life for me is the life 
that I judge to be most satisfactory. This may sound like a fairly empty definition; it doesn’t tell us much specifically 
about what policy makers can do to improve people’s lives. However, as mentioned above, it can be operationalised 
with simple survey questions. The main criticism of understanding wellbeing as being satisfied with life is that people’s 
standards for what counts as satisfactory seem to play too important a role for this to be the main goal of public policy 
(Haybron, 2011). Consider a happy slave; it is possible that some people are satisfied with their lives because they do 
not know how good their life could be if they lived in a different context. Referring again to Michalos’s terminology, 
someone could be satisfied with terrible external conditions, making their life a Fool’s Paradise, which seems much 
worse than a Real Paradise. Helping people to avoid a Fool’s Paradise is one of the main reasons for Sen including 
knowledge in the HDI. Knowledge helps us to evaluate our standards and choose our goals, as well as to more 
effectively pursue and achieve them. 
37  Some people may view some of the LSF flows, or some of the indicators specified in a particular version of the LST, as 
components of wellbeing, rather than contributors. This is not a problem because Treasury is still not stipulating that the 
contributors are components; people are deciding that for themselves. Therefore, this is not a way in which the LSF or 
the LST determine social values. 
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the LST, contribute to wellbeing is to understand them as enhancing people’s capabilities. 
On Sen’s view (1987; 1993; 1999), capabilities are real freedoms to function in ways that 
contribute to their wellbeing. Understanding the policy goals set out by the LSF and the LST 
as capabilities is the clearest way to demonstrate that the particular components of 
wellbeing are left to individuals to decide for themselves. Section 4 unpicks the capabilities 
approach in more detail and discusses a way in which this idea can find practical application. 
While the relevance of economic growth to wellbeing oriented public policy might not be in 
dispute, the importance of some of the LST’s dimensions might be less obvious. Social 
cohesion, for example, allows people to effectively participate in various kinds of 
interactions with other people, including economic, educational, and social interactions. The 
opportunity to participate in economic and educational interactions clearly promotes a broad 
range of potential contributors to wellbeing, but perhaps the value of (non-economically 
productive) social cohesion is less clear. Trusting the institutions that have power over you, 
and the intentions of the people that live around you can have important effects on the 
degree to which people judge their lives as going well (Helliwell, 2006). And, much 
philosophical38 and psychological39 research on wellbeing identifies friendship as an 
important contributor, or an important component, of what ultimately makes our lives go well 
for us. Governments can’t force us to be friends or to trust one another, but they can take 
into account the effects on social cohesion that might result as a consequence of 
implementing a new policy.40  
Perhaps the main misunderstanding of the LSF and the LST envisages them enforcing a 
greater number of substantive value commitments than other policy analysis tools. This is 
simply not the case. The LSF and LST merely encourage a methodological change, which 
amounts to a broader and more thorough analysis, one that considers a wide range of 
potential contributors to wellbeing and how they might interact to affect people’s chances of 
being able to pursue their own view of the good life. It might be suggested that Treasury 
has always attempted to consider a wide range of potential contributors to wellbeing in its 
analyses.  
The LSF and LST encourage analysts to be more systematic and evidence-based in 
considering the same range of issues that have often featured in policy analysis, but usually 
in an ad-hoc or anecdotal fashion. When the LSF recommends broadening the range of 
considerations when assessing public policy proposals, it is not attempting to determine 
social values by favouring any particular conception of wellbeing. This stands in contrast to 
component tools, which come much closer to determining social values by including some 
stipulated components of wellbeing, but not other potential components, in policy 
calculations. The capitals and dimensions of the LSF and LST are all direct contributors to 
many widely accepted components of wellbeing, and are plastic enough to be indirect 
contributors to most reasonable components of wellbeing.  
The flexible approach embodied in the LSF also has the advantage of being able to support 
specific policy tools for which the dimensions of interest are set by political means. For 
example, the key policy assessment dimensions could be voted on by the public, either 
directly or through parliamentary representatives campaigning on a platform of promoting a 
particular set of dimensions. Policy tools that specify particular conceptions of wellbeing, 
such as component tools, may not be able to accommodate as wide a range of dimension 
                                                                
38  This holds whether they follow an Aristotelian conception of wellbeing as flourishing or not (Fletcher, 2013; Ryff, 1989). 
39  See Demir (2015), and for the opposite relationship—loneliness is a very strong predictor of low subjective wellbeing—
see Vander Weele, Hawkley, and Cacioppo (2012). 
40  See Sachs (2015) for more detail on social capital and some policy-related suggestions for improving social capital. 
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choices as the LSF. Imagine that a new park is planned for a city. The new park could 
facilitate exercise, social interaction, nice views for city dwellers, and the development or 
protection of native plants and animal species, but not all of these things. As a contributor 
tool, the LSF could allow the public to decide the weightings or priority of those values, 
something component tools cannot do.41 
All said, it is not clear how the LSF determines social values any more than other potential 
policy analysis tools that result in frank recommendations. Indeed, it seems that the LSF 
probably is, and certainly could be, a framework that is much more inclusive and less likely 
to determine social values than many other kinds of policy analysis tools.  
4  Us ing the  L iv ing  Standards  Framework  as  a  
Wel lbe ing Framework  fo r  Gu id ing Pub l i c  
Po l i cy  
This paper has explained how the LSF, understood as a wellbeing framework for guiding 
public policy, is well-supported by the academic literature, and can be useful without 
determining social values. Now we address the final concern about the practicality of the 
LSF for Treasury’s day-to-day role of assessing policies. As already mentioned, one 
challenge that can be levelled against the LSF is that it is too vague, and that even if one 
grants its theoretical merits it doesn’t help to advance the practice of policymaking in a 
pragmatic sense.  
This part of the paper intends to show how some of the theoretical issues previously 
discussed can make a practical difference for policymaking. To do this, we demonstrate 
how two different wellbeing-related concepts can be incorporated into the LSF to develop 
pragmatic and innovative tools for guiding public policy. Both of these examples are 
illustrative, and further proliferation of these sorts of tools would be required to really 
demonstrate the practicality of wellbeing frameworks like the LSF. But hopefully these start 
to show how the theory can in fact influence practice. 
The first example we focus on is the influence of the capabilities approach in the creation 
of multidimensional poverty indices for policy. The second example is on the potential use 
of subjective wellbeing data in social cost-benefit analyses. We stress that these two case 
studies are not exhaustive, nor unique, when it comes to the ways in which wellbeing 
concepts can yield practical policy tools. 
4 .1  The Capabi l i t ies Approach as an underp inn ing for  
mater ia l  wel lbe ing ind ices 
Although not explicit in the bare-bones model of the LSF, much of the supporting 
documentation has discussed the fit of the model with a capabilities approach (Au & 
Karacaoglu, 2015; Treasury, 2011; Karacaoglu, 2015). Inspired by Nobel-laureate Amartya 
Sen (1987; 1993; 1999), capabilities approaches focus on ensuring that individuals have 
the capability to live the lives they have reason to value.  
                                                                
41  Unless one of the stipulated components is free choice over the issue at hand. 
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4 . 1 . 1  Capabi l i t i es  Approach:  The  bas ic  concep ts  
There are a number of core concepts underpinning the capabilities approach. This schema 
and Figure 5 provide a stylised account of some key features of the Capabilities Approach.42  
• Functionings:  These are ‘beings and doings’, like being well-nourished or 
participating in social life. Various sets of functionings are what makes human lives 
valuable. 
• Capabilities: These are opportunities to achieve functionings. They are the 
capacities which give people the ability to achieve the sets of functionings that they 
value.  
• Conversion Factors: In making evaluations of social outcomes, the capabilities 
approach suggests focusing on the real capabilities of individuals. This means 
accounting for individual, social and environmental conversion factors that can affect 
the extent to which goods and services can be turned into functionings. 
 
Figure 4: Stylised Account of the Capabilities Approach 
 
 
One of the great advantages of understanding the LSF, with its broad range of capitals and 
flows, as a capabilities-based framework is that it encourages policy analysts to consider 
the important ways in which a variety of economic factors interact to create real 
opportunities for people to pursue their own vision of the good life. Understood in this way, 
the LSF accounts for individual choice, and doesn’t need to prescribe a set of capabilities 
that must matter.43 At the same time, the LSF provides a clear reason to focus on diverse 
barriers that prevent people from taking advantage of apparent opportunities—a focus on 
the conversion factors that are relevant for different individuals.  
Access to money is clearly an important resource, and in many cases, is likely to contribute 
to an individual enjoying a range of capabilities. For example, the capacity to provide shelter 
for oneself and one’s family is clearly influenced by one’s ability to pay. But in some cases 
money only realises that potential when other enabling social and economic factors are in 
play. When accommodation is scarce because of local council zoning restrictions, or 
accommodation is unavailable to certain groups of people because of prejudice, then 
money alone may not be sufficient to acquire suitable shelter.  
                                                                
42  These are based on theoretical and practical summaries of the capabilities approach by Ingrid Robeyns (2005; 2006). 
43  Sen himself has always explicitly resisted the desire to prescribe a single list of capabilities, although other theorists 
have attempted to articulate and defend such a list, most prominently Martha Nussbaum (eg, Nussbaum, 2006).  
CAPABILITIES 
 
FUNCTIONINGS 
 
RESOURCES Conversion Factors 
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Choices 
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4 . 1 . 2  How can  th e  Ca pab i l i t i es  App ro ac h in f l u en ce  p ra ct ic a l  
p o l i cy ma ki ng  
The voluminous academic literature on the capabilities approach doesn’t always make clear 
how the central concepts flow through to influence practical policymaking. But in many ways 
it already has, even in New Zealand. A specific example of this can be traced in the policy 
research and analysis that was used to advise the Government on its Budget 2015 child 
hardship package (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet et al., 2015). The objective 
of this policy analysis was to identify options to implement the Government’s overall 
objective to reduce material hardship amongst children. In order to identify the particular 
policy tools that could be used to most directly target assistance towards this group, it was 
necessary to identify households that live in significant deprivation.  
Household income is often used as an indicator of material wellbeing, but it is widely 
acknowledged that this is not the only factor to consider when trying to construct useful 
measures of poverty in more economically developed countries. So instead of using only 
household income measures, this policy process drew extensively on work that is regularly 
published by the Ministry for Social Development (MSD) on a range of income and non-
income measures related to wellbeing (most recently MSD, 2016a; 2016b).  
In line with the LSF, incorporating data on non-income measures in this way represents a 
broad approach to considering the notion of poverty and the appropriate policy response. 
The MSD has implemented this approach with the MSD Material Deprivation Index—a 17-
item list of particular deprivations that are designed to reflect different degrees of hardship. 
The items are particular outcomes, like ‘postponed visits to the doctor’ or ‘being in arrears 
on rates, electricity, or water bills’. 
The development of this index is an example of how some of the goals of the LSF –
broadening and adding structure to the way policies are assessed – are already having a 
practical influence on the policy process in New Zealand. It is entirely concordant with the 
way in which recent scholarship has suggested that the Capabilities Approach can be made 
practical for policymaking.44  
The strengths of this approach are that it draws attention to the non-income barriers that 
contribute to material deprivation – what might be thought of as conversion factors between 
income and capabilities in the conceptual schema of Figure 5. Looking at this specific 
approach through the lens of a capabilities understanding of the LSF, it might also be 
suggested that non-consumption-based conversion factors, such as health and education 
might also play a role in the assessment. A capabilities understanding of the LSF draws 
attention to these various indicators because they are part of the capitals and flows of the 
framework. Furthermore, a capabilities understanding of the LSF draws attention to these 
indicators without determining what weighting or value should be placed on them (which 
can remain a matter for the judgement of various political processes). 
                                                                
44  For example, Alkire (2015) outlines how the capabilities approach has powerful and ongoing relevance for constructing 
indices of poverty and wellbeing. 
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4 .2  Us ing subject ive wel lbe ing data to  assess publ ic  
po l ic ies  
The LSF, or any other wellbeing framework, is not a necessary prerequisite of incorporating 
subjective wellbeing data into policy analysis. However, understanding the overarching goal 
of Treasury to be ‘sustainably improving the wellbeing of all New Zealanders,’ makes it 
appropriate to have an interest in how New Zealanders view their own quality of life, and to 
investigate the usefulness of those subjective assessments to public policy. In this section, 
we discuss two ways in which subjective wellbeing data might be used to guide public policy, 
and we summarise the existing sources of subjective wellbeing data gathered in the 
New Zealand context. 
4 . 2 . 1  Us ing  subj ec t i ve  we l l be in g  da ta  t o  g u i d e  pub l i c  p o l icy  
A potential policy-guiding role for research on subjective wellbeing is to act as a cross-check 
during policy analysis (Treasury, 2011). Social cost benefit analyses (SCBAs) often assess 
the costs and benefits of policy proposals using a range of measures, including: traditional 
economic data, data on natural, human, or social capitals converted into monetary values 
using willingness to pay and related techniques, and perhaps some difficult-to-monetise 
indicators listed by, but not directly involved in, the cost benefit calculation (Treasury 
2015b). Since honest SCBAs usually involve probabilistic forecasts (Treasury 2015b), the 
outputs of most SCBAs display overlapping ranges of values.  
When there exists a considerable overlap between an output benefit and an output cost in 
a SCBA, checking whether subjective wellbeing researchers have investigated how the 
outputs of the SCBA relate to subjective wellbeing outcomes might provide information with 
which to break the statistical stalemate. For example, a policy might have the outputs of 
lowering inflation and employment. Subjective wellbeing researchers have modelled, at 
least in some contexts, the impact on life satisfaction of changes in employment and inflation 
(eg, Di Tella, MacCulloch, & Oswald, 2001; Welsch, 2007).45  
Assuming enough similarity in the contexts, the life satisfaction impact of the policy and its 
main alternative could be approximated, and then, if it provides a clear difference, enable a 
recommendation for one way to decide how to break the initial statistical stalemate. This 
subjective-wellbeing-based recommendation could be offered alongside an alternative 
recommendation to increase the specificity of part of the SCBA in order to break the tie on 
the basis of the indicators already included in the SCBA. A similar method might also be 
used to provide some kind of value to the costs or benefits of any hard-to-monetise impact 
of the proposed policy that currently sits by, but is not included in the calculation. 
While not always required in order to provide robust and frank policy advice, SCBAs that 
incorporate a wide range of potential outcomes and unify them by translating them all into 
some commensurable value can help to simplify difficult policy decisions. We have already 
discussed that income equivalence approaches attempt to do this, but have difficulty 
monetising some kinds of goods. An exciting possibility for the future of SCBAs is making 
marginal effects on subjective wellbeing the commensurable value to which all of the goods 
are reduced. In the first instance, a standard SCBA, with the value of most outcomes 
monetised, and few other hard-to-monetise outcomes mentioned, but not included in the 
overall calculation. A subjective wellbeing approach would then translate the monetised and 
                                                                
45  More examples of subjective wellbeing data being used in policy analysis can be found in Di Tella and MacCulloch 
(2006). 
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hard-to-monetise outcomes into subjective wellbeing terms. These translations are only 
possible if considerable research has been conducted on the relationships between these 
outcomes and a measure of subjective wellbeing in various contexts. Although there is 
much more research that should be conducted, one particular measure of subjective 
wellbeing may already be sufficiently studied to be used in this way. 
Measures of life satisfaction, which ask respondents to rate how satisfied they are with their 
lives on a scale, are the most commonly used measure of subjective wellbeing in happiness 
research (Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2012). As such, we know a lot about the effects of 
income on life satisfaction. For example, average increases in reported life satisfaction 
caused by a set increase in income can be predicted by observing changes in income and 
life satisfaction within individuals over time.46 The same method can be used with life 
satisfaction and non-market goods. When the impacts on life satisfaction of the increase in 
income and the non-market good are known, the value of the non-market good can be 
approximated in increase-in-income terms via the common currency of increase in life 
satisfaction.  
As a result, some non-market good, such as a 10% reduction in crime, could be described 
as having the same impact on life satisfaction as, say, a $2,000 increase in income. Or, 
more simply, that a 10% reduction in crime is worth as much as a $2,000 increase in income 
to the population in question. It should be noted that it only makes sense to use life 
satisfaction as the common currency for SCBAs in this way if it is uncontroversial that it is 
a component of or important contributor to wellbeing (otherwise policy analysts would be 
using a commonality between the various goods that is not in itself valuable).47  
4 . 2 . 2  Sub j ec t i ve  we l lb e in g  d at a  so ur ce s  fo r  pu bl i c  po l i cy  i n  
New Ze a l an d 
The suitability of subjective wellbeing data for policy making in New Zealand depends 
considerably on the availability of quality subjective wellbeing data gathered in 
New Zealand. Policymakers in New Zealand have several subjective wellbeing data 
sources available. Statistics New Zealand produces the high quality General Social Survey 
(GSS).48 Every two years, 8,000 New Zealanders are asked a host of questions related to 
their quality of life. Amongst other questions, the GSS asked respondents about their 
perception of their health and material living standards, their trust in institutions, their 
relationships, their sense of purpose in life, and how satisfied they are with their life. The 
wide variety of subjective measures used in the GSS could be used to investigate how 
objective levels of the LSF capitals or flows are affecting New Zealanders’ perceptions of 
their own lives. Such an investigation could provide information on the marginal rate of 
return on investments in economic, social, human, and natural capital respectively.  
                                                                
46  Other factors known to influence life satisfaction and the relationship between income and life satisfaction are held 
constant (including initial income). 
47  Clark and Oswald (2002) and Fujiwara and Campbell (2011) provide a more detailed explanation, and Powdthavee and 
van den Berg (2011) and van Praag and Baarsma (2005) provide examples of this method in action. For a discussion of 
the relative merits of this and related subjective wellbeing approaches compared to stated and revealed preference 
methods, see Fujiwara and Campbell (2011), Benjamin and colleagues (2013), and Benjamin and colleagues (2014). 
48  See: http://www.stats.govt.nz/survey-participants/a-z-of-our-surveys/general-social-survey.aspx  
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Other data sources that could be used to inform public policy in New Zealand include the 
World Values Survey49, the Gallup World Poll50, the New Zealand Attitudes and Values 
survey51, the New Zealand Values Survey52, the Sovereign Wellbeing Index53, and the 
New Zealand Quality of Life Survey54. Specific geographical positioning data (available from 
the New Zealand General Social Survey and some others) allows for a more nuanced 
understanding of the possible effects of wellbeing that various local or city-level policies 
might have. Given the recent governmental focus on Auckland, Treasury should investigate 
the literature on ‘happy cities’ to aid its policy advice on this issue.55 Although a few 
academics in New Zealand are using local data to generate studies about the subjective 
wellbeing of New Zealanders, there is certainly scope for more academics to generate new 
datasets, use the existing data, and conduct more policy-relevant research.56  
  
                                                                
49  http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp 
50  http://www.gallup.com/services/170945/world-poll.aspx 
51  https://www.psych.auckland.ac.nz/en/about/our-research/research-groups/new-zealand-attitudes-and-values-study.html 
52  http://www.shore.ac.nz/massey/learning/departments/centres-research/shore/projects/new-zealand-values-survey-2005.cfm 
53  http://www.mywellbeing.co.nz/mw/ 
54  http://www.qualityoflifeproject.govt.nz/ 
55  For a review of “happy cities” research, see Ballas (2013), and for New Zealand specific studies, see Morrison (2011; 2014). 
56  Over 10,000 scholarly articles are published on subjective wellbeing per year (Diener & Scollon, 2014), but very few of 
these incorporate data from New Zealand, and even less focus on New Zealand data. 
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